Andre Gironda (Dre) has declared war on WAF (Web Application Firewalls). I found his attack on WAFs a bit amusing because the belief that secure coding will take care of all web application vulnerabilities is quite utopian, and thus more compatible with a more passive-aggressive strategy and not a frontal assault with a war-declaring-gut-stomping-heated list of reasons to discount a technological solution to the problem of web application threat defense.

Today I'm going to focus on reason #2, because I don't believe it's peculiar to WAFs at all.

I won't argue with the breadth of knowledge Dre claims is required to configure a WAF. Having configured WAFs in a previous life I don't find them to be as onerous as he makes them out to be, but I may be biased simply because I have most of the knowledge necessary to do so. So I won't belabor that point. Instead, I will point out that this list of requirements is eerily similar to those necessary for a developer to securely code an application. In other words, both a WAF and secure coding require many of the same skills and investment in order to implement properly.

In fact, I'd argue that developers need more skills and time than this to thoroughly protect a web application. In order to truly secure an application against vulnerabilities a developer would need:

1. Specific language knowledge, to code against language level vulnerabilities 
2. Expertise in frameworks/application server foundations, to code against vulnerabilities that might be introduced via a framework or the application server implementation
3. OS knowledge, to guard against operating system level attacks that can be executed through a web application such as those that arbitrarily execute system level calls
4. Database knowledge, to understand how SQL and specific database features might be exploited
5. Compiler theory, to understand where stack- and memory-based vulnerabilities may exist
6. HTML/CSS/DHTML knowledge, to protect against the myriad methods of exploiting the language and its delivery mechanisms 
7. Network knowledge, to understand how TCP and HTTP might be exploited against an application
8. Security expertise, so the developer knows how attacks are formulated/executed against web applications and how to defend against them
9. Understanding of all relevant regulations (HIPAA, PCI DSS, SOX, BASEL II) and what needs to be implemented in code to achieve compliance
10. Psychic powers, to anticipate new attack vectors and guard against them

I'd argue that Dre expects developers to be security, development, database, systems, regulatory, and network experts. And that's in addition to the requirement that developers understand and be experts in their particular organization's business. In addition to being able to code against the attacks, developers need to know how to launch the attacks, so they can test their solution to ensure it's working properly.

The primary argument against WAFs still appears to be that if developers only practiced more secure coding techniques, no other technological solution would be required, and certainly not WAFs. I don't necessarily disagree. If developers could guard against every attack, sanitized every input, and could anticipated potential and emerging attack vectors, we wouldn't need anything else to protect web applications.

But that scenario is simply a utopian dream, and is completely out of sync with reality. I grant it's a beautiful dream, like the one Thoreau had. But it is just that - a utopian dream.

On Walden's Web, developers have all the skills necessary to combat attackers. They are knowledgeable in a variety of attack methodologies and understand how to protect against all of them. Developers On Walden's Web have a deep understanding of compiler theory, and understanding where stack and memory vulnerabilities may exist - and how to prevent them. (I won't step up on my soap box and rail against the fact that most colleges are removing compiler theory from computer science degree programs.)

On Walden's Web, web application developers are masters of all trades: security, systems, language, web, database, regulatory, and networking experts. They understand the intricacies and delicate dance that occurs when an application is running and what might be exploited next so that they can code up the next solution.

Walden's Web is a beautiful, highly secure place. But like Walden's Pond, it exists only on paper. It is a utopian dream that cannot be achieved because the reality is that developers with all the necessary expertise do not exist in the numbers required, and have other responsibilities (coordination with business folks and needs, analysis, design, testing, maintenance, documentation) that often take precedence.

Neither WAFs nor secure coding are a panacea. Because of that, both should be employed in order to provide the broadest spectrum of defense against attacks.

At least until you can find and hire the developers from Walden's Web.

Imbibing: Coffee